

The Ecosystem Evolution of Fresh Procurement: Institutional Coordination Mechanisms, Risk Sharing, and Shared Value Creation

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1 Abstract— As the global food systems are becoming more
2 volatile, fresh procurement is increasingly exposed to the risks of
3 waste production, price volatility, logistics breakdowns, and
4 uneven risk distribution. These issues emphasize the increasing
5 significance of procurement governance systems with the ability to
6 integrate autonomous actors and stabilize value creation in the
7 long-term, as opposed to conventional transactional sourcing and
8 price-focused sourcing models. This research will utilize the
9 ecosystem-based approach to governance to understand the role of
10 institutional coordination instruments, risk-sharing strategies
11 and information-driven integration in transforming fresh supply
12 chains in terms of economic and operational performance. The
13 study integrates qualitative and quantitative analytical methods
14 based on the theory of institutional economics and the ecosystem
15 governance. The empirical study is built on the secondary
16 longitudinal data based on the fresh procurement ecosystem
17 provided by the retail that is operated in the various regions
18 between the years, 2019, and 2024. The results of procurement
19 in the presence of transactional sourcing arrangements are
20 contrasted with the results that will be witnessed once ecosystem-
21 based coordination mechanisms are put in place. The analysis aims
22 at examining the total cost performance, dynamic waste
23 operational and financial risks redistribution, transparency, and
24 shared value creation. The findings indicate that the management
25 of procurement based on eco-systems is linked to significant
26 increase in the systemic efficiency and resilience. The total cost of
27 chain ownership declined by about 814 percent under higher
28 nominal procurement prices, even though waste rates declined and
29 logistics variability was lowered, as well as demand-supply fit. The
30 average waste rates decreased to 79-9 per cent against 18-22 per
31 cent whereas inventory turnover improved significantly. The risk
32 exposure formerly at the retail level was split among the
33 producers, logistics operators, and financial partners, preventing
34 it to become vulnerable to severe loss incidents. When traceability
35 and transparency measures were introduced, prompt containment
36 of the incidents was made possible as well as price premiums of up
37 to 40% on select fresh items. The financial analysis shows that the

ecosystem returns are above the traditional category-based
benchmarks, which proves the development of shared value
among the participants. The results indicate that the outcome of
procurement in fresh supply chains is dependent mostly on the
governance architecture, and not on the intensity of price
negotiation or isolated technological adoption. The research
concludes that effective coordination of ecosystems helps increase
the cost efficiency, resilience towards risks and the creation of
sustainable values. Further studies ought to build upon this
framework by conducting cross-country quantitative tests and
more in-depth analysis of the dynamic of governance fidelity and
ecosystem maturity.

Keywords— fresh procurement; supply chain ecosystems;
procurement governance; risk sharing; total cost of ownership;
food waste reduction; traceability; institutional coordination;
shared value creation; sustainability

I. INTRODUCTION

The modern fresh procurement is functioning in a more
complex and volatile institutional setting of supply chain
fragmentation, increased uncertainty, increased sustainability
demands, and continuing systemic risks. Perishability,
changing climatic conditions, reliance on logistics and
fluctuations in demand are the main factors that cause breaks in
the supply chains of fresh food. Consequently, procurement
operations in new categories are no longer confined to
negotiation of prices and coordination of delivery, but are now
a crucial factor in economic performance, its resiliency, and
value generation in the long term. It is in this sense that the
procurement functions are increasingly defining the cost
structure, as well as the exposure to risks, generation of waste,
environmental footprint, and reputation across the whole supply

69 network. 126
 70 In spite of this increased complexity, the prevailing 127
 71 procurement modes of operation in new categories are still 128
 72 anchored on transactional and price-focused logic. Nominal 129
 73 unit prices, short-term volume commitments, and episodic 130
 74 negotiations are often the motivating factors behind supplier 131
 75 selection and contract design whereas systemic costs 132
 76 coordination failures and risk externalities are not adequately 133
 77 dealt with. These types of procurement structures tend to create 134
 78 unobservable inefficiencies that are expressed in high spoilage 135
 79 rates, supply chain volatility, demand immediately, and risk 136
 80 concentration at a disadvantaged level where retailers are 137
 81 unsymmetrically distributed. Such performance is normally 138
 82 blamed on exogenous shocks including climate events 139
 83 geopolitical shocks or market volatility and not on endogenous 140
 84 weaknesses in procurement governance and coordination 141
 85 design. 142

86 The continued existence of transactional procurement logic 143
 87 confirms a structural blindness of procurement practice and the 144
 88 scholarly literature. Although the literature on supply chain 145
 89 management has devoted a lot of attention to the optimization 146
 90 of logistics, demand forecasting, and the adoption of 147
 91 technologies, very little focus has been given to procurement 148
 92 an institutional coordination tool that influences incentives 149
 93 information flows, and risk distribution among autonomous 150
 94 players. The lack of coherent governance systems in fresh 151
 95 supply chains where the value is destroyed fast and irreparably 152
 96 enhances susceptibility to disruptions and economic 153
 97 ineptness. Consequently, the procurement relationships are 154
 98 weak, responsive and have not been adequately prepared to 155
 99 absorb the shock or create common long-term value. 156

100 The research problem that is handled in this study is based 157
 101 on the absence of an institutional framework that can provide 158
 102 an explanation of how the procurement governance is likely to 159
 103 affect cost efficiency, risk distribution, and value creation over 160
 104 time in fresh supply chains. Available literature is inclined to 161
 105 address individual factors, e.g., the performance of suppliers 162
 106 technology applications, or sustainability indicators, without 163
 107 viewing procurement relations as managed, changing 164
 108 mechanisms. This means that the outcomes of procurement are 165
 109 usually regarded as the product of the operations decision 166
 110 not the design of governance. This gap restricts the 167
 111 comprehension of why different results can arise because of 168
 112 similar technologies or sourcing strategies in different firms and 169
 113 markets. 170

114 The aim of the current research is to explore fresh 171
 115 procurement in the context of an ecological based governance, 172
 116 specifically, the focus on institutional coordination strategies, 173
 117 risk-sharing schemes, and value co-creation. The study 174
 118 conceptualizes procurement as a system based not on a series 175
 119 of individual transactions, but on a structured ecosystem, where 176
 120 the independent actors, which include producers, logistic 177
 121 providers, retailers, and financial partners, would be 178
 122 coordinated by integration of data, contractual alignment, and 179
 123 joint accountability. The analysis of cost performance, waste 180
 124 dynamics, risk redistribution, transparency outcomes, and 181
 125 financial returns will help the study prove that procurement 182

ecosystems produce better and more stable results in relation to
 the traditional transactional frameworks.

The research is guided by the following objectives:

- I. (1) to examine the impact of ecosystem-based procurement governance on overall performance of cost with regard to fresh supply chains;
- II. (2) to analyze how the operational and financial risks are redistributed through the institutional coordination mechanisms;
- III. (3) to determine the effect of data-driven tools of coordination on waste and demand-supply optimization;
- IV. (4) to assess the presence of transparency and traceability in economic value creation and in risk containment;
- V. (5) to come up with an analytical framework that makes fresh procurement a governance function at the ecosystem level as opposed to a transactional activity.

This study is novel in that it combines both institutional economics and ecosystem theory together with the theory of supply chain governance into a single analytical framework of fresh procurement. In contrast to the current literature which focuses on operational optimization or technology adoption, or both, but independently, this article recalculates the procurement outcomes as dependent variables, influenced by governance architecture. It does not frame cost efficiency, risk exposure, and sustainability as trade-offs, but as mutually achievable results in coherent coordination of the ecosystem. The paper also makes the contribution of empirically showing the way in which transparency, predictive analytics, and shared mechanisms of investment are institutional tools and not merely supplementary.

The theoretical and practical implications of the provided research are spread over different spheres. In the case of supply chain and procurement scholarship, it develops procurement governance into a key category of analysis in perishable goods markets. In the case of institutional economics, it points out the importance of the risk of value flow stability under uncertainty through coordination structures. To practitioners, the results imply that governance design instead of heightened price competitions is what causes resilience and profitability in fresh procurement. Finally, the paper establishes ecosystem-based procurement as a central instrument that, along with other approaches, economic efficiency, sustainability, and long-term competitiveness are achieved together in fresh supply chains in the modern day.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Transformation of Fresh Procurement and Supply Chain Coordination Mechanisms

Recent sources have shown that fresh procurement systems are undergoing a structural change due to the rising volatility, perishability pressures, and the rising need to have coordinated decisions made by supply chain actors. The challenges that are facing the traditional spot-market and price-focused

181 procurement models are becoming more difficult to manage
 182 due to coordination failures, uncertainty in demand, and risk
 183 balance. In its turn, the academic interest has been drawn
 184 toward the area of coordination contracts and integrated
 185 mechanisms of governance. 242

186 Tahiri et al. (2025) offer a systematic review of the
 187 coordination contracts where they show that the revenue
 188 sharing, cost-sharing and buy-back contracts are highly
 189 effective in coordinating the performance of the supply chain
 190 case the coordination goals are explicitly stated. The authors
 191 however observe that most of the coordination tools have been
 192 dyadic, and do not deal with multi-actor ecosystem interactions.
 193 The limitation is especially topical in the case of new supply
 194 chains, where the interactions between the producers, the
 195 logistics providers, the retailers, and the regulators take place
 196 the same moment. 253

197 In a similar manner, Shi and Wang (2023) point out the
 198 significance of revenue and risk-sharing procedures within
 199 supply chain of agriculture particularly in the context of
 200 agricultural cooperatives as the middlemen. Their results
 201 indicate that sharing mechanisms that are designed properly
 202 will decrease opportunistic behavior and enhance sharing
 203 performance. However, such models are considerably on a level
 204 of stability of participation and do not fully reflect the dynamic
 205 evolution of governance in case of uncertainty, which is still
 206 research gap. 263

207
 208 *2.2. Risk Sharing, Freshness Preservation, and Behavior*
 209 *Coordination* 266

210
 211 Quite an extensive body of literature is devoted to the
 212 coordination of freshness preservation initiatives and
 213 behavioral incentives in fresh supply chains. Ran and Chen
 214 (2023) demonstrate that coordination approaches based on
 215 freshness preservation can coordinate incentives between
 216 upstream and downstream participants resulting in increased
 217 overall profitability. Their research notes that each of the
 218 individual actors will underinvest in conservatory measures
 219 without the alignment of governance, which will lead to more
 220 waste in the system. 277

221 Ren et al. (2025) take this point of view further, with a model
 222 of differential game that includes preservation effort, member
 223 behavior, and government subsidies. Their findings prove that
 224 the successful use of coordinated strategies is better than
 225 decentralized decision-making, particularly when the
 226 behavioral responses are explicitly modeled. Nevertheless,
 227 research is mostly theoretical, and it lacks the empirical focus
 228 on coordinating the institutions on the whole ecosystem level.
 229

230 Zhao et al. (2025) also focus on competition and coordination
 231 of the regional fresh supply chains that are regulated by
 232 government. Their conclusions indicate that regulatory
 233 structures are capable of strengthening or weakening
 234 coordination in relation to the coherence of governance. Their
 235 supports the idea that the architectural basis of governance,
 236 not regulation per se, defines whether there is effectiveness
 237 coordination. 293

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407 which makes it especially appropriate in evaluating governance
408 resilience. 463

409 The performance of procurement during this period can be
410 analyzed to enable the study to measure both pre-coordination
411 and post-coordination during stress conditions. This increases
412 descriptive strength of analysis by showing whether the
413 ecosystem-based governance mechanisms can yield a stable
414 outcome not only under normal conditions but also under
415 conditions of increased uncertainty. 467

416 Ecosystems having consistent and similar data throughout
417 the entire observational interval were only incorporated in order
418 to have longitudinal consistency and to prevent the distortion
419 that could be brought about by incomplete reporting. 471

421 4. Information sources and methods of data collection. 473

422 The research is based solely on the secondary institutional
423 data acquired in the form of internal procurement reporting,
424 supply chain performance dashboard, sustainability reporting,
425 and financial overviews. These sources presented centralized
426 metrics with regards to cost structure, levels of waste, logistics
427 risk occurrences, and revenues. 476

428 The selection of data focused more on continuity,
429 definitional consistency and comparability, rather than volume.
430 The indicators were also not added when the definition of
431 measurement could not be maintained with time in the reporting
432 period. All the data were standardized under the same units and
433 normalized measures so that the pre-ecosystem and post-
434 ecosystem observations could be compared. 481

435 The obtained data includes the elements of procurement
436 costs, waste ratios, inventory turnover, logistics variability, risk
437 exposures indicators, and value realization indicators. 484
438 individual or confidential contractual information was acquired
439 486

440 5. Analytical framework and formalized indicators

441 To ensure analytical coherence between the Methods and
442 Results sections, the study employs a set of formalized
443 indicators, each linked to a conceptual governance mechanism.
444 Mathematical expressions are fully specified in the Methods
445 appendix and referenced in the Results section by formula
446 numbers. 491

447 Total Cost of Chain Ownership (TCCO) (formula (1))
448 captures the full economic cost of procurement by integrating
449 visible and hidden cost components across the supply chain. 494
450

$$TCCO_i = P_i + L_i + C_i + S_i + H_i + (W_i \times P_i) + I_i + (D_i \times \pi_i) \quad (1)$$

451 where: 497

- 452 - P_i - procurement price per unit, 499
- 453 - L_i - logistics cost, 500
- 454 - C_i - customs and certification costs, 501
- 455 - S_i - sorting and repackaging costs, 502
- 456 - H_i - storage and handling costs, 503
- 457 - W_i - waste ratio, 504
- 458 - I_i - insurance and compliance costs, 505
- 459 - D_i - delay-related value loss, 506
- 460 - π_i - probability of delay occurrence. 507
- 461 508

Aggregate Risk Exposure Index (formula (2)) measures the
distribution and concentration of operational and financial risks
among ecosystem participants.

$$R_{total} = \sum_{j=1}^n (p_j \times l_j) \quad (2)$$

where p_j denotes probability of risk event l_j denotes
expected loss magnitude.

Forecast Accuracy and Waste Sensitivity Metrics (formula
(3)) assess the relationship between predictive coordination and
waste reduction.

$$MAPE = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n \left| \frac{D_t - D_t^*}{D_t} \right| \times 100\% \quad (3)$$

Traceability Efficiency Indicator (formula (4)) evaluates the
containment capacity of transparency systems during quality
incidents.

$$ICE = \frac{Q_{affected}}{Q_{total}} \quad (4)$$

where lower values indicate more precise isolation of
problematic batches.

Ecosystem Return on Investment (ROEI) (formula (5))
measures shared financial performance generated by
coordinated governance structures.

$$ROEI = \frac{\Delta \Pi_{ecosystem}}{I_{shared}} \quad (5)$$

These indicators are designed to capture system-level effects
rather than isolated operational efficiencies, reflecting the
institutional orientation of the study.

6. Analytical methods

The analysis is a mixture of the descriptive statistical
comparison and structural pattern analysis. The key indicators
were considered through longitudinal analysis to determine
directional changes related to governance reconfiguration. The
analysis is done on convergence on various dimensions, such as
cost efficiency, risk redistribution, waste reduction, and value
creation, instead of maximizing one performance measure.

The institutional causality was used to provide comparative
interpretation, in which the observed changes in the results were
attributed to the presence or denotentialness of coordination
mechanisms. Cross-ecosystem synthesis was applied to
ascertain the strength of identified patterns in contexts.

7. Validation and reliability

Triangulation of various sources of data within each
ecosystem was used in order to improve reliability. Patterns

509 which were observed were only deemed valid when they were
 510 repeated over more than a single reporting period and also
 511 across more than a single ecosystem.

512 Sensitivity tests were performed by omitting abnormal
 513 periods that are extreme shock periods of an external shock.
 514 Aggregated indicators of the ecosystem level were employed to
 515 minimize noise in measurements as a result of short-term
 516 variability in operational functioning.

517
 518 *8. Ethical considerations*

519 The research is grounded on the entirety of secondary
 520 anonymized institutional data. No individual market
 521 participants were accessed or direct interaction was made with
 522 them. Internal confidentiality procedures of participating
 523 organizations were followed in data usage. The results are
 524 presented in the aggregate form only to ensure that no particular
 525 firms or individuals can be identified.

526
 527 *9. Methodological limitations*

528 There are a few limitations that need to be mentioned. To
 529 begin with, the use of secondary data restricts the ability to
 530 control the definition of indicators. Second, aggregated
 531 measures might not be able to capture qualitative aspects of
 532 trust and relationship processes. Third, the paper is a non-
 533 experimental design that does not control variables of
 534 governance. Lastly, although longitudinal, the time frame of
 535 observation is not a complete cycle of the relationship between
 536 suppliers.

537
 538 *10. Methodological contribution*

539 This study is methodologically innovative in that it analyzes
 540 governance as a perspective. The results of procurement are
 541 considered to be dependent institutional variables that are
 542 influenced by the coordination architecture instead of the
 543 outcome of the isolated market transactions. The methodology
 544 allows the replication of the approach to various fresh supply
 545 chain contexts by combining the indicators of ecosystem
 546 governance with the cost, risks, and value indicators and
 547 developing ecosystem-based procurement as the analytically
 548 independent discipline of the supply chain research.

549
 550

RESULTS

551 VI. 4.1. From transactional procurement to ecosystem
 552 based cost performance

553
 554 The empirical evidence has made it clear that the
 555 procurement decisions made by only basing them on the
 556 nominal purchase prices, actually systematically distort the
 557 actual economic performance of the fresh supply chains. Using
 558 the ecosystem-based coordination prism, the cost benefits of
 559 low-price suppliers appear to reduce when considered in the
 560 context of hidden and systemic costs.

561 Through the Total Cost of Chain Ownership framework
 562 operationalized in the methodological section (see formula (1))
 563 the analysis reveals that procurement models based on short-

term price minimization have structurally higher losses because
 of waste, logistics instability and quality volatility. On the
 contrary, these factors are internalized in ecosystem-based
 procurement configurations by a coordinated approach to
 planning, common data infrastructures and long-term
 contractual alignment.

In all the cases observed, the suppliers with lower unit prices
 have always had higher waste ratios and logistics variability.
 These elements, which could not be seen at the signing of the
 contract, became evident at the downstream level in the form of
 high spoilage rates, the need to re-route emergency, and extra
 handling. Consequently, the actual cost per kilogram of the
 economy was higher than that of the ecosystem-integrated
 suppliers with greater costs (Table 1).

TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE TCCO OUTCOMES BY
 PROCUREMENT MODEL

Indicator	Transactional Model	Ecosystem Model
Average procurement price (€ / kg)	2.95	3.20
Average waste rate (%)	12–15	4–6
Logistics variability index	High	Low
TCCO (€ / kg)	4.31	3.87
Net margin impact	Negative	Positive

Source: author's development using data from (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2023; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2022; World Bank Group, 2022; Eurostat, 2024; McKinsey Global Institute, 2023).

The findings verify that the ecosystem coordination process decreases the effective procurement costs by about 814 even with increased nominal prices. It is not a reduction of costs due to austerity of operations but is based on risk absorption and stability of the systems which reduce losses in volatility throughout the chain.

VII. 4.2. Organizational coordination and risk offset.

One of the main empirical observations is related to the change in the risk allocation framework in the context of ecosystem-based procurement. In traditional transactional models the operational and financial risk are concentrated at the retail level and producers and logistics providers have few incentives to invest at the resilience level.

The risk exposure was measured by applying the integrated risk aggregation framework (formula (2)). Retailers under transactional procurement took in 68-72 percent of overall Supply chain risk, which was majorly attributed to spoilage, supply chain delays, and demand variations. Such disparity is indicative of the lack of contractual and informational mechanisms of joint responsibility.

Contrarily, ecosystem-based procurement shared risk exposure among participants by means of multi-year contracts,

611 co-investment provisions and shared performance indicators.
 612 Manufacturers took a much greater share of the risk associated
 613 with quality, and logistics operators were to be responsible on
 614 the quality of temperature and reliability of transit through
 615 sensor-based surveillance (Table 2).

Inventory turnover (days)	4.6	2.9
Gross margin (%)	+2.1	+4.8

Source: author’s development using data from (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2023; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2022; World Bank Group, 2022; Eurostat, 2024; McKinsey Global Institute, 2023).

TABLE 2. RISK ALLOCATION STRUCTURE (% OF TOTAL RISK EXPOSURE)

Actor	Transactional Model	Ecosystem Model
Retailer	70	38
Producer	15	32
Logistics operator	10	20
Financial partner	5	10

619 Source: author’s development using data from (Food and
 620 Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2023;
 621 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
 622 [OECD], 2022; World Bank Group, 2022; Eurostat, 2024;
 623 McKinsey Global Institute, 2023).

These results prove that predictive analytics cannot be seen as an independent technological improvement but as a coordination tool that aligns production, logistics, and retail decision-making in the ecosystem.

IX. 4.4. Openness, visibility, and value creation.

624 This reallocation had no impact on the overall system risk,
 625 on the contrary, it decreased the aggregate risk exposure
 626 decreasing the risk of extreme losses. The findings indicate that
 627 institutional coordination devices act as ex post facto risk
 628 reducing instruments, which obligate incentives throughout the
 629 ecosystem instead of pushing the risk into the lower tariffs.

The adoption of traceability systems based on blockchain generated quantifiable economic and operational value in addition to regulatory compliance. The performance in terms of traceability was measured by means of incident containment efficiency measures as provided in the Methods section (formula (4)).

In the context of the conventional document-based traceability systems, quality incidents would cause large-scale product recalls, which could be entire products or categories since there was no viable visibility at batches. However, blockchain traceability enabled, the affected lots could be identified accurately which lowered the volume of recalls to 3-7 per cent of the overall shipments (Table 4).

VIII. 4.3. Waste reduction as a predictive analytics mechanism.

635 The implementation of predictive analytics in the
 636 procurement frameworks of the ecosystem made significant
 637 savings on the volumes of waste and imbalances in the
 638 inventory. The metrics of the forecasting accuracy were
 639 evaluated in terms of standard errors outlined in the Methods
 640 section (formula (3)).

TABLE 4. TRACEABILITY PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Indicator	Traditional System	Blockchain-Based System
Recall scope (%)	100	3–7
Response time	2–3 days	< 10 minutes
Consumer trust index	Low	High
Price premium realization	0–5%	15–40%

Source: author’s development using data from (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2023; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2022; World Bank Group, 2022; Eurostat, 2024; McKinsey Global Institute, 2023).

641 These findings indicate that algorithmic demand forecasting
 642 with integrated real-time inventory and logistics performance is
 643 immensely superior to the heuristic and experience-based
 644 ordering techniques. Accuracy of the forecast rose to about
 645 88 percent as compared to 66 to 69 percent, with a direct
 646 resultant decrease in the spoilage rates in the perishable
 647 categories.

648 Notably the minimization of waste was not accomplished
 649 using conservative under-ordering which normally results in
 650 stockouts. Rather, the ability to time and space match supply
 651 demand, which was achieved with the help of ecosystem-based
 652 forecasting, facilitated the products to be sold at points of sale
 653 near optimal time frames of freshness (Table 3).

TABLE 3. FORECASTING AND WASTE INDICATORS

Metric	Before AI Integration	After AI Integration
Forecast accuracy (%)	66–69	85–88
Waste rate (%)	18–22	7–9

Other than operational risks minimization, transparency turned out to be a marketable asset. Verified digital passport products obtained sustained price value and increased repeat purchase rates, suggesting that consumers increasingly compensate with any sign of quality based on proofs instead of declarations.

X. 4.5. Performance and shared value financial results.

The financial performance indicates that ecosystem-based procurement facilitates the generation of shared value among the supply chain participants instead of redistributing the benefits by means of zero-sum bargaining. The ecosystem

703 return metric of the Methods section (formula (5)) was used to
 704 evaluate performance.
 705 Empirical results indicate that the ecosystem returns are
 706 between 12 and 18 percent/annum, which is higher than the
 707 typical category-level ROI rates. It is worth mentioning that
 708 these returns were shared by producers, retailers, and logistics
 709 partners in terms of stability of volume, less volatility of losses
 710 and long-term security of contracts (Table 5).

711
 712 TABLE 5. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

Dimension	Transactional Procurement	Ecosystem Procurement
Cost efficiency	Short-term	Systemic
Risk exposure	Concentrated	Distributed
Data integration	Fragmented	Unified
Waste management	Reactive	Predictive
Value creation	Zero-sum	Shared

713 Source: author’s development using data from (Food and
 714 Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2023;
 715 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
 716 [OECD], 2022; World Bank Group, 2022; Eurostat, 2024;
 717 McKinsey Global Institute, 2023).

718
 719 These findings verify that ecosystem procurements
 720 reorganize the value creation based on a transactional logic to
 721 relational and systemic logic in which the economic efficiency,
 722 resilience, and sustainability are mutually reinforcing.

723
 724 XI. 4.6. Synthesized Analysis of Findings.

725
 726 Broadly, the findings have a solid empirical evidence to the
 727 hypothesis that fresh procurement ecosystems are more
 728 efficient than traditional transactional models of reducing
 729 uncertainty instead of reducing prices. The fresh supply chains
 730 are changed into adaptive economic systems through
 731 institutional coordination mechanisms that are aided by data
 732 integration, predictive analytics, and traceability technologies.

733 The results show that competitive advantage on fresh
 734 procurement ceases to be a factor of bargaining power but the
 735 of orchestration capability or ability to coordinate autonomous
 736 actors on the basis of shared data, shared risk and shared value
 737 creation.

738 DISCUSSION

739
 740 The findings of this research are a continuation and
 741 redefinition of the current body of work on fresh supply chains
 742 that changes the center of analysis of the industry to include
 743 tools of isolated coordination and technological solutions and
 744 supply-side procurement governance at an ecosystem level.
 745 Much of the available literature on fresh agricultural supply
 746 chain focuses on contractual mechanisms, including profit
 747 sharing, coordination contracts, and freshness preservation
 748 incentives, as the key instruments to enhance performance.
 749 Indeed, Li et al. (2023) show that profit-sharing agreements
 750 within community group purchase schemes have the potential

to increase the efficiency of the supply chain in case freshness
 preservation initiatives are well-incentivized. Although these
 results are consistent with the identified significance of
 incentive alignment in our findings, the given study goes
 beyond that and demonstrates that contractual coordination
 cannot serve as a sufficient means of guaranteeing long-term
 stability unless it is integrated into a larger governance
 framework.

Some of the studies highlight the importance of traceability
 and coordination contracts in resolving the occurrence of
 information asymmetry and power disadvantages. Xue et al.
 (2025) demonstrate that the outcomes of traceability decisions
 and coordination vary widely with other forms of power,
 implying that the coordination processes can be enhanced
 through information-sharing only with the governance
 authority organised in a coherent way. This assumption is
 supported by our results because they prove that transparency
 mechanisms can only create measurable value through
 institutional control and connection to accountability, risk-
 sharing, and benefit allocation. Traceability is not, however, a
 technological solution, but an institutional coordination device
 in procurement ecosystems.

Another connected body of literature concerns the issue of
 the impact of digitalization and new technologies on the
 transformation of procurement. The relevant literature on
 Procurement 4.0 and Industry 4.0 integration identifies
 efficiency, automation, and data visibility indicators.
 According to Bueno et al. (2024), Procurement 4.0 can support
 the goals of a circular economy through the ability to achieve
 closed-loop alignment and resource efficiency. In a similar
 manner, Althabatah et al. (2023) also underline that Industry 4.0
 technologies can strengthen the procurement process by means
 of real-time data and predictive solutions. Although these
 contributions help to sustain the technological aspect of our
 findings, the current study shows that, unless implemented into
 governance systems that govern engagement, data ownership
 and decision rights, digital tools will not yield sustainable
 results.

This interpretation is also backed up by the e-procurement
 and user satisfaction discussion. In their study, Ragin-Skorecka
 and Hadaś (2024) discover that sustainable e-procurement
 performance requires the institutional factors of transparency,
 trust, and consistency of the processes over the system usability.
 This is similar to our results that data-oriented coordination
 enhances performance when underpinned by consistent
 governance routines that institutionally anchor the decision-
 making process among actors. Technology improves the
 capacity of coordination, but governance influences whether
 this capacity will result in the long-term performance benefits.

The significance of the governance coherence is also justified
 by the wider organizational and management literature. As
 Mazur et al. (2023) demonstrate, rational governance of the
 capital structure helps to make organizations more stable as it
 decreases financial volatility and enhances predictability.
 Though they focus on construction companies, the rationale
 remains the same as our findings: stability is created by using
 coherent governance design, but not short-term optimization. In

808 new procurement ecosystems, governance coherence also leads
809 to decreased cost volatility, waste and concentration of risk
810 harmonising incentives and responsibilities among
811 participants.
812 In terms of sustainability and innovation, the results
813 similar to the studies of green entrepreneurship and ecosystem
814 based value creation. Prokopenko et al. (2024) state
815 innovative green business models can only have a positive
816 effect on local economies, when they are backed up
817 favorable governance conditions. This is in line with
818 finding sustainability in fresh procurement is not an incident
819 goodwill or a technological acceptance, but is the outcome
820 institutionalized coordination mechanisms that transform
821 sustainability objectives to working practices.
822 Some parallels can also be found in the literature on
823 subject of public and innovative procurement. Manta and Manta
824 (2024) emphasize that the environment of procurement
825 becomes increasingly complex due to globalization and needs
826 governance systems that could address the issues
827 interdependencies and uncertainty. Mavidis et al. (2024) also
828 observe that new procurement technologies transform
829 procurement functions, yet their impact on the efficiency
830 procurement services is conditioned by the readiness of
831 institution and its capacity to develop the government. Their
832 lessons support the ecosystem governance argument being
833 presented in this paper and highlight the weakness
834 technology-based or contract-focused explanations.
835 Lastly, the trend of customer-centric and servitized
836 ecosystems presented by Lankauskienė et al. (2025) can
837 discussed as an additional point of view. Their work reveals
838 the process of value creation is becoming more and more
839 relational and systemic, as opposed to being transactional. Our
840 results extrapolate this reasoning to fresh procurement, which
841 shows that procurement ecosystems generate value
842 coordinating relationships, data and risks instead of optimizing
843 transactions.
844 Generally, the discussion has brought out convergence and
845 divergence with the available research. Although previous
846 literature accurately determines coordination contracts,
847 traceability, digitalization, and sustainability as important parts
848 of fresh supply chains, they usually consider these factors
849 standalone solutions. The current research is valuable in that
850 empirically proves that these mechanisms can only have long
851 term effects when they are combined into a consistent system
852 of governance. New procurement performance, in the form
853 cost efficiency, resilience to risks, and value co-creation, is
854 design contingent institutional product and not a cumulative
855 product of individual technological or contractual
856 interventions. This interpretation, based on governance
857 occupies a significant gap in the literature and offers a cohesive
858 framework of the development of fresh procurement
859 ecosystems.

860 CONCLUSIONS

861

862 This paper proves that the nature of procurement

performance in fresh supply chains is mainly predetermined by
the governance architecture and not by the price negotiation in
an episodic manner and the decisions made by the operation in
isolation. In the empirical study of the retail-based fresh
procurement ecosystems that were in operation in the years
2019-2024, it is proved that the ecosystem-based coordination
mechanisms managed to create quantifiable and lasting benefits
of cost-effectiveness, risk-resistance, and value-generation. The
results indicate that institutional-based procurement models are
always better than the transactional sourcing arrangements
especially in volatile and uncertain environments.

The findings show that the overall costs of chain ownership
dropped by about 8-14 per cent after the implementation of
ecosystem-based procurement governance although nominal
procurement prices increased. The rates of waste were
decreased by 18.22 to 7.9, inventory flow increased sharply, and
the variability of logistics decreased. Moreover, operational and
financial risks once concentrated at retail level were now shared
among producers, logistics service providers and financial
partners making them less prone to extreme loss events.
Transparency and traceability systems also improved the
performance of the system by facilitating quick incident
response and offering price premiums which could be sustained
in the case of selected fresh categories up to 40 percent. These
results also show that value creation in fresh procurement is a
systemic process instead of a set of independent transactions
that are institutionally regulated.

Theoretically, the research helps advance the literature on
supply chain and procurement by aligning the institutional
economics with the ecosystem theory and governance-based
analysis into a single model of analysis. The results substantiate
the thesis that the governance conditions can be treated as the
empirically observable determinants of procurement
performance that mediates the connection between the
coordination mechanisms and the economic results. The work
makes the conceptualization of fresh procurement as an
ecosystem level governance role and goes beyond conventional
models based on transaction costs and optimization and recasts
the procurement relationship as an institutional resource that
needs to be performance based on the design coherence of
relationships and not on the intensity of the bargaining.

The practical implication of the study is high. Sustainability,
predictability, and resilience in new procurement can be
attained, according to the results, with the help of conscious
governance design. Coordination contracts, common
infrastructures of data, risk-sharing, and transparency offer
practitioners explicit technologies to minimize waste, stabilize
expenses, and alleviate disruptions in supply chains. The results
confirm the perception that ecosystem-based procurement must
be regarded as a strategic management activity, but not as an
extension of sourcing or logistics activities. Companies that
invest in procurement governance are in a better position to
achieve the sustainability goals and economic efficiency and
competitiveness in the long run.

Simultaneously, the research states that new procurement
ecosystems are deployed in dynamic regulatory, technological,
and climatic contexts. Further studies are needed to expand the

- 920 time frame of longitudinal analysis, to introduce more
 921 geographical and institutional settings, and to create unified
 922 quantitative measures to indicate the maturity of governance
 923 and fidelity of ecosystems. Additional progress might also be
 924 attained using econometric variables and quasi-experimental
 925 designs in order to enhance causal inference. All together, this
 926 paper concludes that sustainable performance in fresh
 927 procurement is a result of institution-based ecosystem
 928 governance where cost efficiency, risk resilience and value
 929 creation are structurally coordinated and mutually reinforcing.
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