

Organisation of Execution of Police Tasks in the Context of Risk Management Process

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Abstract—The paper focuses on the presentation of statutory tasks and procedures applied by the Police in crisis proceedings. The description of the formation is enhanced by its organisational structure which is shown from the perspective of particular stages of crisis management. The author also describes the command system applied by the Police in intervention, action and operation activities. The information presented therein serves as a background for better comprehension of the specifics regarding risk management, security of the state, public order and protection of critical infrastructure. Functioning of the Police formation is possible thanks to widely understood risk management. The Police like other law enforcement agencies and institutions functioning in multiple functional spheres, applies various tools of risk assessment and methods of its analysis.

Index Terms— crisis management, government administration organs, heads of central offices, risk management, the Police.

I. INTRODUCTION

To what extent is it possible to provide the proper level of security and public order in Poland? In reality, the answer to this question lies in the efficiency of the Polish Police as an institution ex officio responsible for security issues. It is a force playing a key role in provision of security tasks executed by combined national administration alongside the National Fire Service, the Municipal Police, the Central Anticorruption Bureau, the Military Police and the Border Police. The Police is a law enforcement agency responsible for maintaining public order, security, property protection and protection of facilities critical for the security of the state. Because of the nature of tasks legally assigned to the Police, the formation is an ideal example of a service which is obliged to apply the procedures of risk management.

The Police is a force ex officio involved in conducting

activities aimed at providing internal security of the state. Hołyst emphasises that the Police forces were created to fulfill tasks provided for by national legislation. The scope of tasks to be executed by the Police is set forth by the legislator in a number of legal acts (Hołyst, 2013). The origins of the formation go back to the old times, with rich interwar tradition culminating with the first State Police Act which was passed on 24 July 1919 (Misiuk, 2008). The contemporary scope of activities of the Police is presented in the table below.

TABLE 1.
STATUTORY TASKS OF THE POLICE

Legal basis	Statutory tasks of the Police
Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police art. 1.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • protection of people's life and health and protection of property against lawless assaults which might cause damage to those goods, • protection of public safety and order, including ensuring peace in public places and in public means of transport, road traffic and on waters allocated for common use, • initiation and organisation of activities aimed at preventing crimes and petty offences and crime-related events, and cooperation with state authorities, local governments and social organisations in that regard, • detection of crimes and petty offences and prosecution of perpetrators thereof, • supervision of municipal guards and specialised armed security forces within the scope laid down in separate provisions, • controlling whether administrative provisions and codes of order related to public activity or binding in public places are observed, • cooperation with Police forces from other countries and their international organisations on the basis of agreements and international treaties and separate regulations, • gathering, processing and forwarding criminal information, • running a database with information on the results of the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).

Source: Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police (Journal of laws of 2011, no 287, item 1687, no 217, item 1280, no 230, item 1371 as amended).

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The paper in its substance concentrates on the presentation of statutory tasks and procedures applied by the Police in crisis activities. The description of the formation has been enhanced by its organisational structure, which is presented based on particular levels of crisis management. Moreover, the author of the paper provides a description of the command system applied by the Police in case of intervention, action or operation. The information presented therein is supposed to form a comprehensive picture of the peculiarities of the organisational structure of the formation including its activities related to risk management of state security and public order and protection of critical infrastructure

II. OUTLINE OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLICE IN POLAND

The structure of the Police forces in Poland reflects the administrative division of the country which means that the tasks of the Police form a segment of activities of the so called combined administration and constitute a part of the crisis management system. Structural divisions refer to tasks carried out by the following services: criminal service, prevention service and the service providing support for the Police activities in the field of organisation, logistics and technology (Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police, Art. 4). On particular levels of Police management there are organs such as: the Commander in Chief of the Polish National Police as a central organ; the Voivodship Police Commanders and the Chief Commander of Warsaw Metropolitan Police; the Poviats (Municipal) Police Commanders and the Police Station Commanders. The Police Commander in Chief, the Voivodship Police Commander and the Poviats (Municipal) Police Commander shall fulfill their tasks with the assistance of their headquarters and the Police Station Commanders with the assistance of their station (Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police, Art. 6g).

In headquarters, in turn, particular services function as offices, departments, sections, cells, links, teams and individual posts. The localisation of the central and voivodeship units, the localisation of training centres and organisational structure of the National Police Headquarters is presented in Fig. 1, Fig.2.



Fig. 1. Organisational scheme of the Police units in Poland.




Fig. 2. Organisational structure of the National Police Headquarters.

A slightly different structure may be observed in case of special and training units, however in the present publication these issues have been overlooked as they do not constitute a part of the author's research.

The smallest but at the same time the most numerous organisational units of the Polish Police forces are police stations, specialist stations and precincts. These local units carry the heaviest burden of tasks correlated around direct contacts with citizens. As an example it should be emphasized that a single police station may consist of such constituents as:

- Criminal department, investigative department, prevention department, patrol and intervention department;
- Beats of neighbourhood/community police officers;
- Criminal section, prevention section;
- Criminal team, search team, officers on duty team, district constables teams, IT team, juvenile and pathology team, presidential team etc.
- Independent posts in particular services.

The Headquarters of Warsaw Metropolitan Police being a separate organisational entity on the voivodeship level, displays slight divergences from the general standard. The Metropolitan Area of Warsaw is divided into areas served by regional headquarters which operate on the same rights as poviats headquarters. Regional Police Headquarters in its organisational structure may include units such as: department, division, section, team, beat, police station and precinct. Heads of police stations constitute the lowest level of the Police organisational structure and they execute statutory police tasks on the level of one or more communes or municipalities reporting to appropriate poviats, regional or municipal headquarters.

III. POLICE ACTIVITIES IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

The entirety of police activities corresponds to particular phases of crisis management what finds reflection in planning documents and distribution of institutional competences. The entirety of activities performed by the Police forces focuses on the four phases shown in the diagram below.



Diagram 1. Phases in police activities in crisis management.

The Police activities in case of emergencies such as natural disasters and technical failures focus on: alarming and warning, cleanup and direct rescue activities as well as attempts at restoration of the original state of things.

The alarming and warning phase consists of:

- Obtaining, processing and providing information on the incident which has taken place for the purpose of management, command and collaboration;
- Providing information and announcements regarding the threat by means of police communication systems and sound amplifying equipment;
- Making the police resources and communication systems available for other services and organs conducting rescue activities in order to pass on information about the threat and for management and command purposes, while maintaining the principle that the aforementioned systems and means of communication will be operated solely by the Police officers.

The cleanup phase consists of:

- Providing uninhibited access for emergency services and rescue teams;
- Organising detours of endangered zones and dissemination of information about these detours;
- Protection of order in places where rescue teams are in operation and securing places which pose additional threat for the life and health of citizens;
- Preventing accumulation of crowds and counteracting outbursts of panic;
- Law enforcement and assuring that commands of chiefs of rescue operations are being obeyed;
- Convoying columns of emergency vehicles transporting the injured, should traffic disruptions occur;
- Assistance in designation of assembly points and parking areas for evacuation vehicles;
- Informing the public on directions, distances and ways of access to the assembly points of evacuation;
- Directing traffic on evacuation routes and, if necessary, convoying columns with evacuees;
- Protection of order in and around first aid stations and in

and around assembly points for casualties;

- Supervision over organisation and functioning of the system of protection of abandoned property;
- Protection of sites where the abandoned property is stored or awaits evacuation, protection of humanitarian aid posts;
- Searching the area for collection, labelling and depositing of bona vacantia;
- Obtaining and disseminating information on medical and first aid facilities as well as storage facilities;
- Keeping a register of casualties and their identification.

The phase of direct rescue activities consists of:

- Assistance in evacuation of victims, the sick and the elderly from the endangered zones and making police means of transport available for the evacuation purposes of people and property;
- Giving first aid to those in need;
- Making police vehicles available for rescue purposes;
- Making police facilities available for the purposes of managing rescue activities;
- Participating in activities securing technical equipment, building fortifications in situations of direct escalation of threats, where forces and means of entities responsible for these works are insufficient or non-existent and abandonment of these works could result in escalation of damages resulting from these threats.

The final phase focusing on restoring the original state of things consists of:

- Directing traffic of people and vehicles;
- Protection of spots where humanitarian aid is distributed;
- Providing information about whereabouts of victims and property;
- Briefing about the current state of the threats.

The heads of the Police organisational units are responsible for execution of the tasks mentioned above. In addition, they are also obliged to implement planning schemes. The schemes include: a written request for approval of the plan to the supervisor of the head of the unit, adjustment sheet, update of the plan as well as operational and remedial documentation.

The operational documents include:

- Main guidelines of the plan.
- Profile of threats (description and map):
 - Natural disasters - hurricanes, floods, forest fires etc.,
 - Technical failures – transport of dangerous substances (by road and rail), fires in cities, petrol tanks (liquid and gas), failures of appliances with toxic industrial substances, road, rail, air and building disasters, failures of water facilities etc.,
- Tasks of the head of an organisational unit of the Police in the conditions of natural disasters and technical failures in reaction and reconstruction phase.
- Tasks of the head of the unit of the Police executed as a result of a specific threat including: alarming and warning, cleanup and rescue activities with respect to restoration of the original state that existed before the threat occurred.
- Organisation of activities of a unit of the Police:
 - procedures of duty service proceedings,
 - functioning of an internal alarming system as well as

- functioning of the general warning and alarm system,
- determination of forces and measures needed for the execution of tasks,
- mode of appointment of the head and personnel of the command unit,
- provision of communication for the purposes of the conducted activities,
- logistic support of activities,
- preparation of a spare command post,
- evacuation plan of one’s own unit.
- Organisation of cooperation with services and public administration organs with territorial responsibility with respect to: warning and alarming, exchange of information, providing communication, logistic support of activities.

The remedial documents include: samples of announcements, notices, lists of specialists, members of crisis response teams and other documents indispensable for a specific police unit.

The whole system of the police operations may be conducted as an intervention, action or a police operation. The command system in case of an intervention concentrates on:

- ‘determination of the type of threat and forwarding information about the threat,
- isolating the area and organisation of road traffic,
- maintaining security and public order,
- property protection and evacuation,
- investigative activities (in case of a technical failure), providing first aid to the those in need’ (Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police).

The Police command system in case of an action consists of:

- ‘evaluation of the threat through determination of its nature and estimation of its development,
- determination of the purpose of undertaken activities,
- determination of tasks for holders of posts in respective areas and coordination of their execution,
- evaluation of volumes of forces and resources and request for backup when necessary,
- designation of own command post (an advanced command post),
- organisation of communication facilities for the command purposes,
- designation of a press officer responsible for issues related to the incident,
- cooperation with rescue operations commanders,
- cooperation with the commander of activities on the level of Police operation (if there is one),
- cooperation with public administration organs with territorial responsibility,
- reporting about current situation and activities to the superior’ (Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police, Art. 6).

Command in case of an operation focuses on:

- ‘evaluation of the threat, through determination of its nature and estimation of its development,
- determination of the purpose of undertaken activities,
- delegation of tasks to the heads of sub-operations,
- issuing demand for additional forces,

- supervision of execution of tasks conducted by subordinate forces,
- coordination of communication for the purposes of the conducted activities,
- coordination of logistic, medical and technical back up,
- setup of an own command post,
- cooperation with heads of rescue activities,
- cooperation with organs of central and local government administration,
- cooperation with the media,
- reporting about current situation and activities to the superior’ (Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police, Art. 7).

The cycle of the command process is presented in the diagram below. Particular steps come down to: formulating, communicating and raising awareness about the aim of the activity, obtaining, processing and sharing information, forecasting, selection and delegation of tasks, planning, organising and coordinating, stimulating, motivating and supervising over tasks execution.

The analysis of statistical and historical data conducted with respect to the Police activities made it possible for expert groups to develop procedures which can be applied in case of a crisis situation.




Diagram 2. Process of the Police command system.

Source: Didactic materials of the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno.

Within the police activities directly linked to crisis management proceedings, it was possible to develop a series of procedures allowing to systematize activities and identify threats. Risk assessment was based on historical data, analyses of figures and applying consultation elements and analytical expert teams.

The interrelations between threats, tasks executed by the Police and the institutional scope of cooperation in crisis situations are presented in Table 3 which presents a selection of threats.

TABLE 2.
POLICE PROCEDURES IN THREAT SITUATIONS (T – THREAT, TA – TASKS,
C – COOPERATION).

PROCEDURE	
I.	SOCIAL PROTESTS – ROAD BLOCKADES
T	1. Paralysis of road traffic of various magnitudes (local, poviata, voivodship, national, international roads). 2. Breach of security and public order in road traffic. 3. Creating dangerous situations for health, life and property of the road users as well as for the protesters taking part in the blockade. 4. Threat for security and public order in the area of the protest caused by the use of dangerous objects, chemicals and flammable substances. 5. Threat for health and life of police officers.
TA	Initial phase:

PROCEDURE	
	a) obtaining information about the organised blockade, b) determination of traffic rules, designating and disseminating information on detours in cooperation with territorially competent road administrators, c) dissemination of information on traffic disruptions caused by the ongoing blockade and informing about alternative routes and detours, d) determination of forces and resources needed for correct execution of the task, e) provision of information on the situation, f) organisation of communication system, g) organisation of cooperation, h) appointing the commander of operations, preparing the agenda for the commander of the operation (action), i) issuing the decision on appointing the command post, preparing the agenda for the commander of the operation, obtaining a plan of the area of operations which includes access and evacuation routes. Implementation phase: a) if necessary – assisting competent entities in the negotiation process, b) informing the blockade organisers about the necessity to discontinue any unlawful activities and about the right of the Police to start proceedings aiming at removing the blockade, c) informing persons with parliamentary immunity about the necessity to leave the area of operations. d) removing the rioters and their equipment, e) preparing a report from activities including the description of the course of action and any extraordinary occurrences, losses in the police property, volumes of used forces and resources and sending it to the head of staff, f) ongoing documenting of events on film and photography.
C	1. Territorially competent road administrator. 2. Competent organ of public administration. 3. the Municipal Police – as an agency supporting police operations. 4. Ambulance. 5. the Fire Department in case of fire threat. 6. the Border Police, should the roadblock occur in the vicinity of a border.
2	OCCUPATION AND BLOCKADE OF FACILITIES
T	1. Breach of security and public order. 2. Possibility of occurrence of danger for life, health or freedom of citizens . 3. Disrupting or paralysing smooth functioning of the entity. 4. Possibility of considerable losses in property.
TA	Initial phase: 1. Receiving, through the emergency line or otherwise, the information about the blockade or occupation of a facility. Sending there a police patrol in order to verify the information and conduct initial threat evaluation, i.e.: - identification of the blockade organisers and the reasons of the protest, - number of participants, - estimated duration of the protest. 2. Preparing and disseminating information on any disruptions that have occurred in the vicinity of the blocked facility. 3. Getting in touch with the facility administrator (head of the administration office) to obtain necessary information on: - arrangement of emergency exits as well as the floor plan of the building, - information on the number of people remaining on the premises (including employees), - any systems of physical or technical protection functioning in the facility. 4. Informing the prosecutor with territorial jurisdiction about the incident and assuring that the prosecutor is present during police proceedings. 5. Ensuring smooth circulation of information about the situation. 6. Organisation of the communication system. 7. Organisation of cooperation. 8. Issuing a decision on appointing the command post, preparing the agenda for the commander of the operation, obtaining a plan of

PROCEDURE	
	the area of operations which would include access and evacuation routes. Implementation phase: 1. If necessary, providing assistance to competent entities in the negotiation process. 2. Obtaining from the facility administrator (owner, manager) a written request to restore the original state in which the institution would be able to resume normal functioning. 3. Directing adequate police forces and resources to the facility. 4. Informing the rioters (in the presence of the prosecutor and the property manager) about the necessity to discontinue any unlawful activities and about the right of the Police to start proceedings aimed at removing the blockade. 5. Informing persons with parliamentary immunity about the necessity to leave the area of operations. 6. Initiating activities aimed at removing the blockade. 7. Preparing a detailed report from activities. The report must include: - extraordinary occurrences (e.g. number of injured officers), - losses in police property, - number of apprehended persons, volumes of forces and resources used. 8. Ongoing documentation of events on film and photography.
C	1. Property administrator (owner). 2. Ambulance. 3. the Fire department. 4. the Municipal Police – supporting activities. 5. the Electricity emergency service. 6. the Water and sewage emergency service.
3	TERRORIST ATTACKS ON:
	- diplomatic facilities of all countries depending on the intensity of the threat and premises of American and western companies including their adjacent facilities and areas, - airports including cargo ports and civil aviation, - government facilities, - shopping centres, multiplexes, big railway and bus stations, - facilities and installations important for social security (e.g. drinking water intakes, pumping stations, filters, dams, water reservoirs, large bridges, telecommunications antennae), - plants manufacturing dangerous materials or their distributors, - transports of dangerous substances, - sanctuaries, - sport facilities during mass events (concerts).
T	1. Causing a large scale of material losses (damage to facilities). 2. Threat for life and health of people remaining on the facility under attack. 3. Disruptions to infrastructure in networks (radio and television, energy, communication etc.). 4. Forcing demands e.g. releasing imprisoned terrorists, paying ransom, taking hostages, planting bombs. 5. Increase in crime against life, health and property. 6. Homicides of persons under special protection. 7. Putting fire to facilities. 8. Attacks with the use of explosives. 9. Robbery (in order to finance terrorist activities). 10. Cyber-terror. 11. Kidnapping. 12. Hijacking of means of transport (trains, buses, aircrafts etc.) with passengers. 13. Chemical, biological and radiological attacks. 14. Reducing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies. 15. Total negation of the legal system in force caused by the struggle for survival. 16. Causing road, rail, air and waterways catastrophes in order to paralyse transport and communication. 17. Increase in death and sickness rates caused by a terrorist attack. 18. Reducing the efficiency of rescue and medical services caused by the increase in the number of casualties (no beds in hospitals, shortage of resources, medicaments etc.). 19. Total chaos on the crime scene.
TA	1. The National Fire Service and the Railway Police in order to monitor transport and places of storage of harmful substances which may pose threat for public security.

PROCEDURE	
	2. The Internal Security Agency, the Military Counterintelligence Service, the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Police, the Border Police in order to exchange knowledge on terrorism-related crime and sources of its financing. 3. PWGT: international groups involved in identification and prevention of terrorism. 4. Europol and Interpol. 5. The Government Protection Bureau. 6. The Minister of Health. 7. Neighbouring countries within trans-border cooperation. 8. Mass media. Ongoing cooperation within exchange of information on crossing the borders and migration of persons suspected of a terrorist activity, territorially competent Border Police stations. The analysis of all obtained information on the possibility of a terrorist threat and exchange of such information between the Internal Security Agency, the Government Protection Bureau, the Military Police, the Border Police as well as other services and agencies.
4	APPLICATION OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES
T	1. Threat for life and health of citizens who found themselves under terrorist attack in which explosives were used. 2. Causing considerable material losses in the danger zone. 3. Discontinuation of communication by road, rail and air. 4. Discontinuation of energy and heating supply, limited or broken radio and telephone communication. 5. Attempt to extort a certain action from central or local authorities. 6. Unwillingness to abandon the place of residence and insisting on remaining in the danger zone and the need to undertake activities aimed at restoring order by the Police in order to support a unit of local government. 7. Devastation and robbery of private and public property left behind by owners because of evacuation of the area under a potential threat of an explosion. 8. Chaos in the area of rescue operations and disruptions in security and public order during proceedings. 9. Disruptions in traffic occurring along evacuation routes or access roads for police and rescue vehicles caused by the onlookers and their vehicles (cars, bikes etc.). 10. Impaired efficiency of medical services activities caused by the hospitals being full and insufficient amounts of medicaments and first aid supplies.
TA	1. Receiving a report about a bomb scare. 2. Sending the Police Mine and Pyrotechnic Squad to the bomb scare location. 3. Searching the area and conducting threat assessment by members of PMAP squad. 4. Issuing a decision (by the Chief Commander on voivodeship or metropolitan level) about engaging the PMAP squad and appointing the head of the action (operation). 5. Initiating collaboration with command posts of rescue services, inspection, municipal services – appointing a person responsible for circulation of information. 6. Collecting necessary information on the scene of the incident (description of the terrain, access routes, local infrastructure i.e. sewage system, electricity and gas networks) graphic schemes, building plans, topographic maps. 7. Designation of places of concentration of regular and prevention forces sent by other units. 8. Practical implementation of procedures and the algorithm of proceedings. 9. Balancing of available forces and resources in order to satisfy the direct needs related to securing the scene of the incident, evacuation of people, providing access roads, conveying emergency vehicles, determination of needs with respect to the number of staff, transport of equipment and communication with other units. 10. Resolving of the crisis situation by neutralisation of the explosive device (defusion) or transporting it for defusion in military training grounds. 11. Collection of evidence.
C	1. Fire Emergency Service. 2. Medical services.

PROCEDURE	
	3. The Municipal Police. 4. The technician on duty. 5. The Electricity emergency service. 6. The Water and sewage emergency service. 7. The Gas rescue service. 8. The National Atomic Energy Agency. 9. Health Department.

Source: own work based on the Directive of the Police Commander in Chief no 1429 of 31 December 2004 on crisis response procedures (HQ Official Journal no 3 of 28 January 2005, item 8); The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft concluded in Tokyo on 14 September 1963 (Journal of laws of 1971 no 15, item 147) and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act Against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971 (Journal of laws of 1976 no 8, item 37).

With respect to the activities undertaken by the Police one may speak of a number of risk related stages: risk identification, risk evaluation and measurement, reaction to risk as well as risk administration and surveillance. During risk assessment proceedings one may speak about its certain hierarchisation i.e. determination of the highest probability of its occurrence. It is achieved through determination of the level and volume of the identified threat and, further on, through examination of historical data, figures and consultations with experts in the presence of representatives of local communities. The most commonly used methods are the matrix methods, which offer just approximations, but still, their accurate determination leads to obtaining the reflection of the actual level of threat (Table 3, Table 4, Chart 1).

TABLE 3.
A SAMPLE MATRIX FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABILITY IN A DESCRIPTIVE WAY.

Probability	Description
5	Very probable at least once a year
4	Probable once every 1-10 years
3	Quite probable once every 10-100 years
2	Rather improbable once every 100-1000 years
1	Improbable less often than once every 1000 years

Source: Crisis management, didactic materials of the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno.

TABLE 4.
A SAMPLE MATRIX WHICH DESCRIPTIVELY DEFINES CONSEQUENCES OF A THREAT TO LIFE.

Consequences	Description
A	Negligible temporary light discomfort
B	Limited few injured, moderate discomfort
C	Serious many injured, considerable discomfort
D	Very serious fatalities, a great number of injured
E	Disastrous many fatalities, hundreds of injured

Source: Crisis management, didactic materials of the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno.

Risk is calculated as the product of value of a threat incident probability and result of this incident.


$$CR = P \times S$$

where:

P – probability

S – determine result

CR = calculated risk



Source: Crisis management, didactic materials the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno.

Risk assessment is a starting point for planning the course of action, which depends on the state of threats for a specific community, environment or facility.

With this respect the following must be determined:

- ‘Where are the risk posing regions located?’
- How to describe and define threat?
- How to evaluate the threat and risk zones with respect to the objects (regions) which may pose a threat? Then it is necessary to conduct hierarchisation of objects (regions) carrying risk.
- How to utilize the obtained results?’ (Directive no 982 of 21 September 2007 on regulations governing organisation and mode of execution of the Police tasks related to reconnaissance, counteracting, combating crimes and offences committed during sporting events and on gathering and processing information related to security of mass sporting events).

The forecasted scenarios are the basis for developing variants of activities in the action plans of heads of police operations. Depending on the kind of risk and related estimated potential threat the following criteria for scenario building are selected:

- Quantitative criterion – forecasted number of participants in the incident,
- Topical criterion – forecasted place where the threat may occur,
- Threat criterion – forecast of the nature of the occurrence (Directive no 982 of 21 September 2007 on regulations governing organisation and mode of execution of the Police tasks related to reconnaissance, counteracting, combating crimes and offences committed during sporting events and on gathering and processing information related to security of mass sporting events).

Special attention should be paid to the issue of providing security during mass events. Risk assessment and risk analysis here is conducted by collaborating with organisers of sport events and other non-police related agencies who are responsible for providing security, organization and, if necessary, conveying transports of football fans, cooperation with other entities with respect to prevention activities focused on counteracting and combating incidents of aggression and violence (Act of 20 March 2009 on mass events security).

Moreover, pursuant to the act on security of mass events, the chiefs on municipal and poviata levels are obliged to issue an opinion based on the conducted risk analysis in order to foresee possible threats to security and public order related to each upcoming mass event (National Program of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2018).

The necessity to apply the tools of risk assessment in case of domestic violence incidents has been dictated by the necessity to prepare police officers to use, in a professional and orderly manner, the tools offering an outlook on threats for life or health of people affected by domestic violence. As a global consequence, these procedures are aimed at raising the efficiency of police activities with respect to elimination of pathologies in social life. It is closely related to the execution of the Police statutory tasks leading to provision of security for those affected by domestic violence.

Since 1 August 2012 the Prevention Bureau and the Road Traffic Bureau of the Police Headquarters has been implementing a project under the title Standardised tools of risk assessment in domestic violence – enhancing competences of European Police officers (The Road Traffic Bureau of the Police Headquarters, Standardised tools of risk assessment in domestic violence – enhancing competences of European Police officers).

As a part of the implemented procedure an algorithm has been developed which consists of the following steps:

- 1) Initiate the Blue Card procedure – fill in section A;
- 2) Hand it over to the victim - part B;
- 3) If the behaviour of the perpetrator constitutes an offence stipulated in articles 156, 157, 160, 197, 207 of the criminal code – consider apprehension of the perpetrator;
- 4) When in doubt whether to apprehend the perpetrator or not, fill in the questionnaire and use it – answer ‘yes’ to any of questions 1-3, or 6 ‘yes’ answers to questions from 4 to 13;
- 5) Be aware of the legal basis of apprehension [attachment no 2].
- 6) Initiate the Blue Card procedure, fill in sections A and B in the presence of an adult and hand over part B to the parent or a legal guardian;
- 7) If the behaviour of the perpetrator constitutes an offence stipulated in articles 156, 157, 160, 197, 207 of the criminal code – consider apprehension of the perpetrator;
- 8) When in doubt whether to apprehend the perpetrator or not, fill in the questionnaire and use it – if you provide answer ‘yes’ to any of questions 1-4, or to 5 questions out of questions from 5 to 13;
- 9) Consider taking the child away from the family and placing it in an intervention-type foster home or in an intervention-type educational care facility;
- 10) Pursuant to Article 572 of the Code of Civil Procedure notify the Family Court;
- 11) If necessary call medical assistance.

APPENDIX

Risk assessment questionnaire
 If risk factors occur put x in the boxes.

1	Were there acts of violence with the use of a dangerous object or were there threats that a dangerous object would be used?	<input type="checkbox"/>	Answer YES to five or more questions from the above questions (1-3) CONSIDER APPREHENSION
2	Did the perpetrator threaten to take the victim's life? Does the victim fear for his/her life? Does the victim think the perpetrator is capable of homicide?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3	Were there attempts to strangle the victim?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4	Has the violence towards the victims intensified recently?	<input type="checkbox"/>	Answer YES to five or more questions from the above questions (4-13) CONSIDER APPREHENSION
5	Is the perpetrator mentally impaired, has the perpetrator ever been treated in a psychiatric institution?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
6	Is the perpetrator intoxicated (alcohol, narcotics, drugs)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
7	Does the perpetrator have a criminal record for domestic or non-domestic violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
8	Has the perpetrator ever threatened to commit or attempted to commit suicide?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9	Has the victim ever attempted to commit suicide?	<input type="checkbox"/>	In every case proceed with the BLUE CARD procedure.
10	Is the perpetrator obsessively jealous of the victim of violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
11	Has the victim broken up with the perpetrator recently?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
12	Has the perpetrator ever beaten up the victim while she was pregnant?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
13	Is there a gun in the household?	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Perpetrator – a person suspected of using domestic violence		Victim – a person that is allegedly a subject of domestic violence	
Domestic violence- a single or repeated intentional action or neglect violating...		The next of kin (pursuant to Article 115 paragraph of the criminal code) – a spouse, ancestor, offspring, relative in the same...	

No 1. Tools of risk assessment in case of domestic violence. Questionnaire 1

Risk assessment questionnaire

If risk factors occur put x in the boxes.

Be aware that there may be more than one child in the family.

The questions about the situation of a child are addressed to an adult.

1	Does the perpetrator beat, hit, push or throw a heavy object at the child?	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Did the perpetrator throw the child on the floor?	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Did the perpetrator strangle the child?	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Did the perpetrator burn the child with a cigarette or use other hot object?	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Did the perpetrator hit the child with an object or threw an object at the child?	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Does the perpetrator shout at the child and use aggressive or abusive language?	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Have you ever been forced to protect the child against the perpetrator?	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Did the perpetrator threaten or frighten the child?	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Do you think that the perpetrator may hurt the child?	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Has such aggressive behaviour towards the child happened before?	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Are there any visible signs that the child is neglected?	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Are there any other worrying behaviours towards the child?	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	The child is between 0 and 6 years old or with disability.	<input type="checkbox"/>

Answer YES to any one question from the above questions (1-4)
CONSIDER APPREHENSION OF THE PERPETRATOR OR TAKING AWAY THE CHILD.

Answer YES to five or more questions from the above questions (5-13)
CONSIDER APPREHENSION OR TAKING AWAY THE CHILD

In every case proceed with the BLUE CARD procedure.

No 1. Tools of risk assessment in case of domestic violence. Questionnaire 2.

IV. CONCLUSION

The analysis of available tools for risk assessment, the methods of analysis and the forms of risk management used by the Police forces in Poland, made it possible to draw the following conclusions:

- the use of the tools and methods of risk assessment is on the increase,
- the widest application of risk assessment tools can be observed on central and voivodeship level,
- it is advisable to extend the application of tools and methods of risk management on municipal, regional and poviatt level,
- in some areas of police activity a number of standardized tools and methods is used such as managerial review, health and safety, fire safety etc. In others there is a considerable lack of movement towards standardization,
- the general management policy in the Police forces to a large extent assumes application of tools and methods of risk management what finds reflection in the mission and vision of the Police, creation of tasks, development of priorities and determination of measures for task execution,
- development of procedures applied by the Police with respect to crisis management is preceded by risk assessment,
- the most frequently used tools and methods include: historical analysis, data analysis, expert teams and data

collected from local representatives. Other tools typical for functioning of a police formation are: reconnaissance of district constables, operational and investigative activities, police databases, criminal analyses etc.,

- it seems legitimate to extend the number of existing procedures by an element defining the probability of occurrence of certain risks,
- it is necessary to extend the application of tools of risk assessment with respect to particular threats to be dealt with by the Police,
- the Police training programme with respect to the issues constituting the subject matter of the present paper should be dramatically extended,
- motivating the police executives to develop and implement new methods and innovative research tools is equally vital.

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