

SPEED Groups as a Tool for Reducing Aggression and Risky Behaviour in Road Traffic: A Criminological, Psychological and Organisational Analysis

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Abstract— *This article examines the activities of the Police SPEED teams as an element of the system for reducing road aggression, serious speeding offences and other high-risk behaviour. The analysis draws on Polish and international literature in transport psychology, criminology and road traffic law enforcement, documents of the Polish National Police Headquarters and the National Road Safety Council, as well as regulations governing traffic control and measuring instruments. Publicly available materials make it possible to reconstruct the teams' tasks and the scale of detected offences. The absence of a continuous data series prevents changes in national crash rates from being attributed to SPEED. The functional rationale for unmarked patrols lies in their ability to observe driver behaviour before intervention and to increase the perceived probability that an offence will be detected. The value of this approach depends on the appropriate selection of locations and the reliability of the evidence collected. The way performance is assessed also matters. The number of fines reflects team activity; assessing the impact on safety requires separate measurements of speed and driver behaviour combined with crash analysis.*

Keywords— SPEED groups, road aggression, risky behaviour, road safety, prevention, Police

I. INTRODUCTION

A road crash usually unfolds within a few seconds. For those injured, however, it may mark the beginning of years of rehabilitation and occupational limitations. Their families and the institutions that bear the costs of intervention are also affected. In 2025, 20,925 road crashes occurred in Poland. They resulted in 1,660 deaths and 24,590 injuries, including 7,866 people classified as seriously injured. Compared with 2024, the number of fatalities fell markedly, while the number of

seriously injured people increased slightly. The overall picture therefore shows improvement in only some of the basic indicators (Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council 2026).

Excessive speed is of particular importance. Risk is also increased by aggression towards other road users and behaviour commonly described as reckless driving. The National Road Safety Council report states that in 2025, 20.4% of crashes were caused by driving at a speed inappropriate to road conditions, while 14.1% were caused by drivers aged 18-24 (Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council 2026). Police data, in turn, show the scale of violations detected during traffic checks. In 2025, 2,514,224 cases of exceeding the speed limit were recorded, including 26,507 instances of exceeding the limit by more than 50 km/h in built-up areas (National Police Headquarters 2026). These statistics cover the entire road traffic service, but they show why speed remains one of the main areas of police enforcement.

SPEED teams were established to detect behaviour that tends to disappear as soon as a marked police car is noticed. An unmarked patrol can capture a manoeuvre in the context of the entire driving sequence. This applies to tailgating and forcing another driver to leave a lane, as well as a series of risky overtaking manoeuvres or rapid acceleration between speed restrictions. Such observation raises questions about measurement accuracy and the permissible limits of enforcement. The choice of location and the way results are assessed are also important. The number of offences alone provides too little information. Evaluation should include the actual level of danger as well as the technical and legal correctness of police actions. Public perception remains a separate issue.

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The article is analytical and review-based. The literature and document search was conducted in stages from December 2025 to 31 May 2026. Library catalogues and scientific repositories were searched first, followed by websites of public institutions. Polish and English combinations of keywords relating to SPEED groups, road aggression and road rage, marked and unmarked patrols, speed enforcement and evaluation of law enforcement were used. Studies on mechanisms of risky behaviour and methods of traffic supervision were included in the analysis, together with publications presenting primary data useful for assessing effects. Sources were selected purposively. The study is not a systematic review.

The source material included Polish and international publications in transport psychology, criminology and law enforcement, documents of the National Police Headquarters and the Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council, and applicable legal acts. Two official local police communications were used to illustrate the planning and scope of interventions; they do not constitute a representative sample. The analysis covers the period from the nationwide establishment of SPEED teams in 2019 to the end of 2025. The core of the study is the distinction between enforcement activity, immediate outcomes and lasting safety impact. Publicly available data do not form a consistent series linking annual SPEED activity, enforcement locations, changes in speed and the number of incidents on monitored road sections. For this reason, the article assesses the teams' operating mechanism and the conditions for their reliable evaluation without attributing changes in national crash rates to them.

II. ORIGINS, ORGANISATION AND TASKS OF SPEED TEAMS

The formation originated in the Warsaw police garrison. A SPEED team began operating there in late 2018, and on 19 July 2019 the solution was extended to all Provincial Police Headquarters. The National Police Headquarters presented it as a response to aggressive behaviour and particularly dangerous offences, primarily speeding, failure to yield right of way, improper overtaking and violations endangering pedestrians (National Police Headquarters 2019; 2020). The solution was not intended to duplicate the full range of tasks performed by a regular road traffic patrol. The teams were separated so that they could respond quickly to behaviour with a high potential for harm.

Experienced road traffic officers were assigned to the teams. Their primary tools became unmarked vehicles equipped with video recording systems, supplemented by handheld speed meters with image recording. In practice, the decisive factor is the ability to maintain safe contact with the observed vehicle and to record material that allows the course of the incident to be reconstructed. In aggressive driving cases, the danger often results from the entire sequence of events. A driver may first close in on the vehicle ahead and flash the headlights, then suddenly change lanes or brake. A single speed reading does not fully describe such a situation, including 308,728 related to speeding. During the same period, 18,773 driving licences were suspended for exceeding the speed limit by more than 50 km/h

in built-up areas (National Police Headquarters 2020). These figures document the scale of activity. The question of outcomes remains open because no changes in mean speeds on monitored road sections, aggressive behaviour or crash severity were reported.

The practical scope of intervention is illustrated by an incident recorded in Szczecin in August 2025. A patrol stopped a 43-year-old Volkswagen driver after a speeding offence on Krygiera Street. The check revealed that he had no driving licence. He was also subject to three court driving bans, and a drug test returned a positive result. The speeding offence therefore became the first signal leading to the removal from traffic of a driver burdened with several independent high-risk factors (Municipal Police Headquarters in Szczecin 2025).

Specialisation is meaningful only when a team focuses on the most dangerous violations. Assessing it primarily by the number of fines encourages the selection of locations that are convenient for measurement even when risk is greater elsewhere. This is how management through an easily available indicator works: the organisation begins to produce the result that is easiest to count. In the case of SPEED, the number of interventions can assume this role while the objective of reducing danger moves into the background.

III. ROAD AGGRESSION AND RISKY BEHAVIOUR IN ROAD TRAFFIC

In everyday language, road aggression, reckless driving, dangerous driving and road rage often overlap in meaning. Scientific analysis requires them to be distinguished. Risky driving may result from haste or an incorrect assessment of one's own abilities; sometimes it reflects sensation seeking without hostility towards a particular person. Aggressive driving includes an element of pressure or dominance. Road rage denotes an escalation of conflict. Anger may then lead to retaliation and threats and, in extreme cases, to violence. Sansone and Sansone (2010) describe road rage as behaviour clearly disproportionate to the offence attributed to another road user. Odachowska and Gąsiorek (2016) place the issue within the broader psychological determinants of risky behaviour.

Aggressive behaviour includes, among other things, driving at a very short distance behind another vehicle in order to force it out of a lane, deliberately cutting another vehicle off, sudden braking in front of another car, blocking lane changes, dazzling another driver with headlights, or demonstratively using the horn. The danger lies in reducing the time and space available to another driver to react. The target may brake too hard, leave the intended path or respond with aggression, initiating another stage of the conflict. Pawelec (2018) shows that legal classification depends on the specific manner of conduct and the degree of danger created. The consequences of the act also matter; the colloquial name of the event does not determine its legal assessment.

Road rage is only one possible cause of a major speeding offence. Such driving may also be explained by recklessness, haste, risk-taking tendencies or an incorrect assessment of the vehicle's capabilities. For a SPEED patrol it remains relevant

because speed affects both crash probability and the severity of consequences. Evaluation must therefore preserve the distinction between speed and aggression. The number of speeding tickets cannot be equated with the number of cases of road aggression. Combining all violations into one category makes it impossible to determine how often teams respond to conflicts between drivers and how often they respond only to excessive speed.

Transport psychology does not reduce dangerous driving to a single personality trait. Bąk-Gajda and Bąk (2010) view safety as the result of interactions among the driver, the road situation and the organisation of the system. Wontorczyk (2011), in turn, shows that behaviour behind the wheel is regulated both by relatively stable individual characteristics and by current conditions such as fatigue, time pressure, emotions or the presence of passengers. The stereotype of the “road pirate” as a uniform type of offender overlooks this variability.

One common mechanism is overestimating control. A driver who has repeatedly exceeded the speed limit without negative consequences may interpret the absence of a crash as confirmation of personal skill. This overlooks the role of chance and the behaviour of other road users. Repeated success may therefore narrow risk assessment rather than encourage caution. Mamcarz (2018) discusses the importance of cognitive functions, psychophysical dispositions and personal determinants of risky behaviour; their interaction influences how a driver recognises danger and whether behaviour is corrected in time.

Aggression most often emerges when a neutral event is interpreted as an action personally directed against the driver. Ordinary slowing in the left lane may be regarded as deliberate blocking. An unintentional mistake may be treated as provocation, and refusal to allow a lane change as a sign of disrespect. Retaliation may follow such an interpretation. From a preventive perspective, it is important to disrupt the sense of anonymity and impunity before the conflict develops into behaviour that endangers others.

Relationships associated with age and sex are statistical, so a simple offender profile based on these characteristics would be unreliable. The National Road Safety Council report indicates that the share of crashes caused by drivers aged 18-24 increased from 13.7% in 2024 to 14.1% in 2025. The scope of these data does not allow identification of which incidents were aggressive in nature (Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council 2026). Young age may be associated with less experience and a stronger tendency to take risks. Aggressive behaviour also occurs among older drivers (Odachowska 2012). Analysis of circumstances should include time pressure, prior conflict and substance use. The presence of passengers and the way the behaviour of others is interpreted are also relevant.

The group of people exposed to the consequences of aggression is broader than its direct target. A sudden manoeuvre may force reactions from successive drivers, and a conflict in one lane may spread to an entire line of vehicles. A cyclist or pedestrian may not be involved in the dispute but can nevertheless enter the path of a vehicle avoiding a collision. Intervention against aggressive driving is therefore justified

even before a crash occurs. The protected interest becomes the safety of the entire traffic situation, extending beyond the relationship between two people in conflict.

IV. PREVENTIVE MECHANISMS OF UNMARKED PATROLS

A marked police car influences behaviour through visibility, prompting immediate adjustment: drivers slow down, put away their phones and often increase following distance. This effect may weaken after the enforcement point has been passed. An unmarked vehicle makes the location and timing of intervention less predictable. It allows officers to observe behaviour before the driver recognises the patrol. The two forms of enforcement therefore serve partly different purposes.

A review of 66 studies conducted for Transport for London does not confirm a consistent advantage of mobile unmarked patrols. Stationary and clearly visible enforcement more often reduced offences and incidents; stationary checks conducted from unmarked vehicles could also be effective. These studies indicate different functions of the two forms of enforcement. A visible patrol exerts a stronger influence on behaviour at the enforcement location, whereas an unmarked patrol facilitates detection of behaviour that usually disappears once the Police are noticed (Elliott and Broughton 2005).

From a preventive perspective, the estimated probability of sanction is crucial. A penalty perceived as unlikely may influence behaviour less than a moderate sanction regarded as a realistic possibility. Hołyst (2022) discusses prevention and social control in the broader criminological context; in road traffic, their practical equivalent is the belief that a serious violation may be detected even outside a fixed enforcement point. A SPEED team does not need to be present everywhere. For drivers, what matters is awareness that the location of enforcement remains uncertain.

For SPEED teams, the ability to observe behaviour that disappears when a marked police car is seen is particularly important. This applies especially to tailgating, forcing another driver to leave a lane, aggressive lane changes and illegal racing. In such cases, a speed reading captures only part of the intervention. The recording makes it possible to document relationships between vehicles that are important when assessing the level of danger.

Intervention also affects the stopped driver. Playing back the recording confronts the driver's own interpretation of the incident with an external view of the behaviour. Even when the driver rejects responsibility, the recording makes it harder to reduce the discussion to one person's word against another's. Documentation therefore combines an evidentiary function with a possible individual preventive effect. It shows following distance, the dynamics of the manoeuvre and the reactions of other road users.

Programmes aimed directly at aggressive driving likewise do not produce a uniform picture. In an NHTSA study, average speeds fell slightly in Marion County and more clearly in Tucson. In both locations, the number of crashes during the six months of enforcement was higher than in the corresponding period of the previous year: by 32% in Marion County zones

and by 10% in Tucson zones. The structure of those incidents differed, however. The share of crashes involving factors associated with aggressive driving increased by 6% in Marion County but decreased by 8% in Tucson. Stuster even considered the possibility that intensified enforcement might have contributed to some conflicts, while also noting increased traffic volume, and ultimately assessed the Tucson programme more favourably. The outcome depended on programme organisation, intensity of enforcement and the chosen method of measurement. The mere presence of a specialist patrol did not guarantee a reduction in crashes (Stuster 2004, pp. 27-32).

The influence of an unmarked patrol has clear limits. A driver acting in intense anger may not calculate risk at all. A similar problem concerns intoxicated or drug-impaired drivers and those seeking strong sensations. Some road users also learn to recognise police vehicle models and use applications that warn about enforcement. The final level of safety also depends on infrastructure, automated enforcement, education and enforcement of other regulations. Within this system, SPEED performs a specialised function.

V. LEGAL AND TECHNICAL CONDITIONS FOR THE RELIABILITY OF INTERVENTION

The effectiveness of enforcement depends on whether the evidence can be verified. A control speedometer installed in a police car does not operate in the same way as a handheld laser speed meter. Regulations concerning speed measuring devices permit the speed of the controlled vehicle to be determined on the basis of the speed of the vehicle in which the device is installed or on the basis of travel time over a section of known length. The device must also enable identification of the vehicle to which the result relates (Journal of Laws 2019, item 1081).

For this reason, the numerical value visible on the screen should not be analysed separately from the entire recording. The measurement process, traffic conditions, the manner in which the police vehicle is driven, unambiguous identification of the controlled vehicle and compliance with the operating instructions of the device all matter. The regulation requires recording of the result, the date and time of measurement, an image or sequence of images and data identifying the vehicle. The material must also be protected against unauthorised alteration. These are basic requirements of a reliable measurement.

In disputes concerning the so-called closing-distance error, there is no simple answer applicable to every device and every situation. If the result is determined from the speed of the police car, the way its position is maintained relative to the controlled vehicle may be crucial. In another measurement mode, different parameters will matter. Assessment must be based on the device instructions and documentation as well as the full record of the operation. A general belief that every recording is conclusive does not provide a sufficient basis.

The Road Traffic Act also specifies the conditions for exercising the privileges of an emergency vehicle. An unmarked police car performing official duties does not automatically acquire the right to disregard traffic regulations.

Such privileges are linked to the use of the required signals and the exercise of particular caution (Journal of Laws 2024, item 1251). In practice, the boundary between observation and the creation of additional danger must be monitored particularly carefully. The need to collect evidence cannot justify behaviour that induces another driver to react suddenly.

Particular care is required when separating two functions of the recording. The material records speed and sometimes other offences as well, including failure to maintain distance, cutting another vehicle off or dangerous overtaking. Individual findings may require different methods of measurement. If an intervention is based on a sequence of manoeuvres, the officer should explain the source of each conclusion: the image or the instrument reading. This distinction reduces the risk that one disputed element will undermine an otherwise properly documented incident.

Procedural reliability matters beyond the outcome of a particular case. Even if a driver rejects a sanction, a complete recording and an explanation of the measurement method allow the driver to assess police conduct. Incomplete material or an unclear procedure can easily shift a dispute from a single incident to a general belief that enforcement is arbitrary. The quality of evidence is therefore also an element of building trust.

VI. STATISTICAL DATA AND LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION

Between 2019 and 2025, the number of road traffic fatalities in Poland fell from 2,909 to 1,660. The decrease is substantial. During the same period, however, regulations and the schedule of fines changed, infrastructure and automated enforcement developed, vehicle equipment changed and traffic volumes fluctuated. The COVID-19 pandemic also had an impact. On the basis of national data, the contribution of SPEED teams cannot be isolated from this multifactorial trend.

Figure 1 presents the general context of road safety. The nationwide introduction of the teams coincided with the beginning of a period in which the number of fatalities declined. This is only a temporal coincidence. Determining the contribution of SPEED to this change would require local and comparative data.

It is also worth noting the difference between the Police's preliminary summary and the later report of the National Road Safety Council. In January 2026, the Police reported 21,000 crashes, 1,651 fatalities and 24,715 injured people. After the SEWiK database was updated, the National Road Safety Council report recorded 20,925 crashes, 1,660 fatalities and 24,590 injured people, respectively. The difference results from the date on which the data were closed and from subsequent database verification. A scientific article should identify the version used because even a minor correction may alter calculated indicators (National Police Headquarters 2026; Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council 2026).




FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF ROAD TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN POLAND, 2019-2025

Source: authors' own compilation based on National Police Headquarters data presented in the report of the Secretariat of the National Road Safety Council (2026). The chart presents the national trend and does not determine an independent effect of SPEED teams.

The Police summary for 2025 reports more than 2.5 million detected speeding offences. This figure concerns the entire road traffic service, of which SPEED is only one part. Without information on enforcement intensity, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the figure reflects driver behaviour and the extent to which it reflects detection. It may indicate that the problem persists. It may also reflect more effective detection of violations; both phenomena can occur simultaneously (National Police Headquarters 2026).

VII. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING SPEED TEAM ACTIVITIES

The simplest indicator, the number of detected offences, measures team activity: the number of checks and the structure of recorded violations. Conclusions about behavioural change require a different type of data. The number of suspended driving licences likewise refers only to detected cases; the number of incidents prevented remains unknown. Evaluation should therefore consider outputs, immediate outcomes and long-term impact separately.

An outcome may be a reduction in speed on an enforced section or less frequent aggressive behaviour, including illegal racing. Lasting impact is reflected in the number and severity of crashes. It should also appear in driver behavioural norms and residents' sense of safety. These levels may change at different rates. A large number of fines may produce no lasting effect. The opposite can also occur: fewer interventions may produce substantial benefit if they are carried out in the right location.

A useful point of reference is provided by the studies of Klepacz and Bryniarska (2024a; 2024b), in which speeds were measured while a speed camera was operating and after it was temporarily removed. Automated enforcement differs from a mobile patrol, but the comparison design is useful. For SPEED operations, speed and incident numbers should be measured before, during and after enforcement, and the results should be compared with a similar road section without additional enforcement. Such a design makes it possible to account for seasonality and roadworks. General changes in traffic volume should be controlled separately.

Evaluation should also include procedural quality. Relevant measures include the completeness of recordings, the number of substantiated complaints, outcomes of cases in which the measurement was challenged, and compliance with device

instructions. Another dimension is the appropriateness of patrol deployment: the proportion of operations conducted at crash locations, reported racing sites, locations with high operating speeds or pedestrian risk. Such a set of indicators would be more difficult to manage than simply counting fines, but it would correspond much more closely to the purpose of the formation.

The importance of local intelligence can be seen in an intervention by the Tychy SPEED group in April 2021. On national road No. 44, officers stopped a 19-year-old driver who exceeded the speed limit by more than 50 km/h in a built-up area and overtook at a pedestrian crossing. The patrol was operating on a section identified by residents through the National Safety Threat Map as a location of repeated speeding offences. The placement of enforcement therefore corresponded to a reported risk (Provincial Police Headquarters in Katowice 2021).

Local evaluation should also account for displacement. Drivers may slow down on a frequently monitored section and then accelerate again a few kilometres further on. The effect is then limited to the enforcement point. Improvement along an entire road corridor can only be established after neighbouring sections and the period following a reduction in enforcement intensity have also been examined. This makes it possible to distinguish lasting behavioural change from short-term adaptation to the known presence of a patrol.

A full evaluation also requires qualitative material. Residents' complaints and short descriptions of interventions may reveal the timing of illegal races or typical aggressive manoeuvres. Recordings from locations where conflicts repeatedly occur can, in turn, link incidents to road design. Such sources help explain why a similar number of checks produces an effect in one location but no clear impact in another. Quantitative measurements remain the basis for assessing speed and crash rates.

TABLE 1. DIMENSIONS FOR EVALUATING SPEED TEAM ACTIVITIES

Indicator	What it allows to assess	Main limitation
Number of checks and detected offences	Team activity and the structure of actions undertaken	Does not prove behavioural change or a reduction in crashes
Share of high-risk violations	Focus on major speeding offences, aggression, dangerous overtaking and racing	Requires uniform classification and complete reporting
Change in speed before and after operations	Direct behavioural change on the monitored road section	The effect may be short-lived or displaced to another road

Indicator	What it allows to assess	Main limitation
Change in the number and severity of incidents	Safety outcome in a given area	Without a comparison section, the effect of the patrol is difficult to separate from other changes
Quality of evidentiary material	Procedural correctness and durability of case outcomes	Requires data on complaints, proceedings and the way measurements were performed
Public assessment and residents' reports	Sense of safety and trust in Police operations	Opinions may depend on individual experiences and the way actions are communicated

Source: authors' own work.

The table separates indicators of activity, outcomes and impact. A high number of interventions demonstrates intensive team activity. Lasting improvement in safety can be established on the basis of behavioural and incident measurements conducted over time and in comparison areas.

VIII. ORGANISATIONAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Statistical pressure does not have to take the form of a formal ticket quota. It is enough for management to compare teams regularly only by the number of interventions. Officers then adapt to the way their work is assessed and choose activities that provide a predictable result. Behaviour that is more difficult to detect may therefore receive less attention even when it creates a greater danger. This applies particularly to aggression between drivers and illegal racing.

A second problem is the fiscal perception of enforcement. The deterrent effect of a severe penalty depends on public belief that the Police act where a real danger exists. Enforcement near a school or pedestrian crossing is usually easy to justify, as is enforcement on a section with a high number of crashes. Much greater doubt is raised by a location perceived by drivers as having been selected solely because it is convenient for measurement. The rule applies regardless of the driver's opinion, but the way enforcement is planned and communicated affects the assessment of the institution.

Controversy also concerns the behaviour of the patrol itself. A rapidly approaching unmarked vehicle may be perceived as pressure, especially when the driver does not know that it is a police car. An allegation of provocation cannot be resolved on the basis of a short recording or a one-sided account. A complete record is needed to show speed, following distance, lane changes and the moment when intervention began. The standard of service combines evidentiary effectiveness with the obligation not to increase danger.

The previously cited communications from Szczecin and Tychy serve an illustrative function only. Conclusions about effectiveness require aggregate data. The way results are communicated also matters. A message limited to the number of fines and suspended licences creates an image of a formation focused on punishment. More informative are data on the types of behaviour detected, the locations of operations and changes in the situation after enforcement. Trust is supported when actions are transparent and proportionate and the material presented allows them to be verified.

Publishing criteria for selecting locations does not require disclosure of patrol schedules. The Police may indicate that an operation was initiated after a series of crashes, residents' reports or intelligence concerning street racing, and then present changes in speed or incident numbers. Such information preserves the unpredictability of enforcement while showing that resources were directed according to identified risk.

IX. DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER EVALUATION

The concept of SPEED teams has a functional rationale. An unmarked patrol makes it possible to observe a driver before intervention and to record manoeuvres that are not visible during a routine point check. Uncertainty about the patrol's location increases the perceived risk that a violation will be detected. Specialised staff and equipment facilitate concentration on the most dangerous offences. These characteristics explain the expected operating mechanism. Available data still do not allow the impact of the teams on national crash rates to be determined.

The greatest weakness of the current evaluation approach is the information gap. Public data document the first year of operation and the number of detected offences well. In later years, summaries more often concern individual police garrisons or the entire road traffic service. There is no uniform dataset enabling comparisons between provinces, types of intervention, road sections and the durability of effects. In the absence of such data, some assessments attribute all improvement observed after 2019 to the teams. Others treat the continued high number of detected speeding offences as evidence of ineffectiveness. Neither conclusion follows from the available material.

Reliable evaluation should be conducted locally and then aggregated nationally. Data on speed and violations should cover the entire operational cycle, from a baseline period to measurement after operations end. Incidents should also be recorded and a comparison road section designated. The analysis should account for traffic volume, seasonality, roadworks and other forms of enforcement. Surveys of drivers concerning perceived enforcement risk and analyses of complaints about patrol conduct could provide additional information. Similar designs have been used in international evaluations, combining data on speed and incidents with baseline measurements and comparison sections (Stuster 2004; Elliott and Broughton 2005).

The model should identify road sections on which a mobile unmarked patrol produces the greatest benefit. It should also

reveal locations where its presence primarily produces a statistical output. This distinction matters from a cost perspective. A specialised team should be deployed where its capabilities are genuinely needed; in some places a cheaper and more predictable enforcement measure may be sufficient.

Interventions should also be classified according to their subject matter. Current summaries usually emphasise speed, whereas the name and assumptions of the formation refer more broadly to aggressive and particularly dangerous behaviour. A standardised classification should separately record major speeding offences, tailgating, cutting off other vehicles, dangerous overtaking, racing and violations affecting pedestrians. Without this distinction, it is impossible to assess whether the teams retain their specialist character.

Social research could supplement operational data, provided that it is carefully designed. A simple declaration of concern about SPEED is a poor reflection of actual behaviour. Greater value would come from combining survey data with speed measurements and analysis of actual interventions. Only agreement among several sources would make it possible to assess whether awareness of unmarked enforcement influences driving behaviour. Its influence on the way drivers describe their own behaviour remains a separate question.

X. CONCLUSIONS

SPEED teams have a functional and organisational rationale within the road traffic enforcement system. Of particular value is the ability to observe driver behaviour in motion and to document longer sequences of dangerous manoeuvres. This makes it possible to interrupt situations that are difficult for a marked patrol to capture. The preventive mechanism is based on a less predictable risk of detection. At the same time, the collected material shows the entire course of an incident.

The nationwide decline in fatalities can serve only as context for evaluating SPEED. Available data do not allow a specific share of this trend to be attributed to the teams. Fines and suspended driving licences show the scope of the formation's work. The durability of change can be assessed through local measurements, comparisons over time and data on the types of incidents detected.

Ultimately, the value of a team depends on deployment to high-risk locations and on reliable evidence. The evaluation system must not reward the number of sanctions. Under these conditions, SPEED can complement automated enforcement, infrastructure, education and other Police activities. Limiting evaluation to the number of interventions provides a precise description of activity but no knowledge of its impact on safety.

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